Syria's ultimate objective is NOT Lebanon.

I am always shocked to read distinguished analysts, such as the admirable beirutspring editor falling fool to the typical lebanese syndrom of "Syria wants to own us" (probably because we are all too smart and beautiful).

In principle it is indeed true that Annapolis could be inconsequential for Lebanon. I do however disagree with the bulk of your reasons, which I think reflect a fundamental misconception of Syria’s interests.
“Syria’s real demand is Lebanon, not the Golan” . That quote expresses the intellectual symptom of a profound, though understandable, misunderstanding of Syria’s key interests.Bashar El-Assad’s real interest is to stay in power and “in the money”. Power as far as Assad is concerned is based on a full spoon of fear among the populace, as well as a need for legitimacy. Legitimacy of the Assad regime is based on 1) arabism, whose sole rationale is the struggle against the “zionist enemy”. 2) it relies on a certain social pact with the Syrians by which the regime provides food and stability in return for political apathy. That is why the Golan and not Lebanon is so important to Bashar and his clique. If they want to consolidate their legitimacy they have got to get Israel on its knees and present themselves like the triumphant victors of a 40-year long struggle. Lebanon in this respect is only important in so far as it allows Syria to increase its leverage on Israel through the southern borders. Syria did that first through the Palestinians until 1983 and then with Hezbollah. Lebanese need to understand that, especially the Christians from the FL, if they are to have a sober view of what is happening today.Now, “what about the murder of Harriri” you will ask me! The Syrians had without doubt a key interest in this horrific murder. But not because they so wanted to own Lebanon per se. The problem they had with Rafiq Harriri is that he had become too important to control. Rafiq Harriri enjoyed solid international support, he was about to realign with the Christians, but most importantly as a successful and Powerful Sunni he was the only moderate Levantine politician from the Sunni sect capable of mounting a very serious challenge to the Assad regime from within Syria. Rafiq Harriri’s friendship with Abdul Halim Khaddam has to be understood in this light. Syria, who still needed, and still needs, Lebanon at that time had no other choice than assassinating a person who had the charisma and network necessary to uproot the Assads in Syria.
Finally a brief word on being “in the money” (which means to be profitable). Assad does not need to own Lebanon to be in the money. Quite to the contrary. What he needs is economic reform, FDIs, trade relationship with decent countries, and a nice pipeline from Kirkouk to Tartouz. The problem is that he cannot liberalize the economy without loosening the nod around the average Syrian’s neck and without challenging his own internal barons. In order to have the strength to do that, Bashar need to regain the Golan, parade in Damascus as the long awaited hero, and implement the long awaited reforms. It is doubtful whether he has the necessary skills for that, but that is not what I am discussing here and he still has some times left to learn and be convinced.

Annapolis will be inconsequential for Lebanon, if Syria and the US cannot agree on the price of Syria’s return to the community of decent nation. Bashar will want guarantees that the UN tribunal will not incriminate him, nor his brother in law (that will suffice to keep the latter happy), he will want guarantees that Israel will dismantle the colonies on the Golan and agree in principle on sovereignty over the waters of the sea of Galilee, he will demand to keep a Syria friendly president in Lebanon so that he can regulate Hezbollah and use it as his last bargaining chip that he will only drop once the Syrian flag floats on the shore of the Sea of Galilee. It is not at all sure that the US will agree with that price. That is why I agree in principle that Annapolis might be inconsequential.